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onflict of laws involves primarily the areas of choice of law, judg-
ments, and judicial jurisdiction. During this survey period Texas
case law reflects continued refinement of choice of law principles,
some activity with little substantive change concerning treatment of foreign
judgments, and a continuing state of flux as to judicial jurisdiction.
I. CHOICE OF LAW
During the survey period, courts in Texas continued to refine their appli-
cation of the most significant relationship test,' which, by a decision re-
ported during the previous survey period, was extended to apply to nearly
every case heard in Texas. 2 In so doing the courts appeared to lend some
* This Article is dedicated to the memory of A.J. Thomas, late Dean Ad Interim and
William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law at Southern Methodist University
School of Law. Dean Thomas authored several of the prior survey articles on Conflict of
Laws.
** B.S., University of Houston College of Pharmacy; J.D., Southern Methodist Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
**** B.A., College of William & Mary; J.D., University of Virginia. Attorney at Law,
Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
1. The most significant relationship test directs a court, absent a contrary statutory di-
rective, to apply to a case the law of the state that has the most significant relationship with the
cause of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international system,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(0 certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
2. During the previous survey period the Texas Supreme Court decided Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). In Duncan the court extended the applica-
tion of the most significant relationship test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
to actions based on contract decided in Texas. Id. at 421. The test had first been applied to
tort cases decided in Texas in Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980),
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degree of certainty to the factors considered in interest analysis. 3 In Wood v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. 4 the court considered choice of law questions in con-
nection with an action alleging multistate publication of matter that alleg-
edly invaded the plaintiff's right to privacy. The court opined that in actions
of the sort considered in Wood, the plaintiff's domicile is the primary deter-
minant of which state's law will apply. 5 The case arose as a result of the
conversion of certain sensitive photographs by an individual who subse-
quently sold them to the defendant, the publisher of an adult magazine. The
defendant ran the photographs in its magazine along with certain textual
material, the latter of which the court held placed the plaintiff in a false
light.6 In upholding a substantial jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the
court determined that Texas law applied to the case because the plaintiff's
domicile was Texas.7 In its opinion the court reasoned that Texas choice of
law rules required application of that state's substantive law, placing great
emphasis upon the plaintiff's domicile and effectively disregarding the de-
fendant's contacts with another jurisdiction.8
and Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). For a discussion of Duncan, see Dalton,
Josephs & Oleynik, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 395, 395-97
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Dalton]. For a discussion of Gutierrez and Robertson, see Newton,
Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 333, 349-51 (1981).
3. Interest analysis, a factor in the most significant relationship test, is the determination
of which state's interests are most affected by the adjudication of the particular cause of action.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971), which sets forth the de-
terminative factors to be considered by a court when undertaking interest analysis, provides:
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
4. 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984).
5. Id. at 1087.
6. Id. at 1089-90.
7. See id. at 1087.
8. The court noted that the injury occurred in Texas, the parties' relationship was cen-
tered in Texas, and the plaintiffs' residence was in Texas. Id. The court also relied extensively
upon commentary appended to § 145 of the Restatement (Second), which states in part:
In situations involving the multistate publication of matter that injures the
plaintiff's reputation. . . or causes him financial injury. . . or invades his right
of privacy. . . . the place of the plaintiff's domicile, or on occasion his principal
place of business, is the single most important contact for determining the state
of the applicable law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment f (1971). The court virtu-
ally disregarded any contacts other than those associated with the plaintiffs, stating that the
only contacts in California were the defendant's place of business and the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred. 736 F.2d at 1087. Those contacts were, obviously, not
nearly sufficient in the court's view to raise a colorable argument that California law should
apply. See id. By applying Texas law, the court determined that the applicable limitations
period was supplied by the Texas two-year statute that governs actions "for injury done to the
person of another." Id. at 1087 (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon
Supp. 1985). Under that reasoning the plaintiffs could maintain their action, which would
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In Brown v. Cities Service Oil Co.9 the court applied the most significant
relationship test to a personal injury action in which the plaintiff invoked the
court's diversity jurisdiction. In Brown the plaintiff was an employee of the
third-party defendant, Augenstein Construction Company, a contractor at
the defendant's facilities in the Lake Charles, Louisiana area. Under con-
tract with the defendant Augenstein was to provide maintenance, repair, and
renovation of the defendant's installations. That contract, which was exe-
cuted in Louisiana and was to be performed in Louisiana by Louisiana labor,
contained a clause providing that Augenstein would indemnify Cities Service
for claims made thereunder. In granting the plaintiff a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, the district court applied Texas law.1° The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the parties' contacts with Texas were minimal
and that Louisiana law should, therefore, apply. I I
have been barred under either California law or the one-year Texas statute of limitations that
applies to injuries to character or reputation by libel or slander. 736 F.2d at 1087; See TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5524(1) (Vernon 1958).
Similarly, in Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738 F.2d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth
Circuit held that the district court had properly applied Texas law to a libel action. As it had
done several weeks earlier in the Wood case, the court held that the plaintiff's domicile is
virtually dispositive of the choice of law issues in cases involving injury to reputation. The
court noted that Texas had expressed a strong interest in protecting its citizens from defama-
tion, as is evident in the Texas defamation law. Id. Texas courts, therefore, would apply
Texas law to the the case. Id. Although Wood and Levine both gloss over the defendant's
domicile as a factor to be taken into consideration in interest analysis, commentators and
courts alike have suggested that the plaintiff's residence might be one of the less significant
interest analysis factors in libel actions. For example, one commentator has suggested that a
uniform law governing libel actions be adopted, containing a choice of law provision applicable
to interstate libel actions and providing that the defendant's liability must be proven under the
law of the jurisdiction where the actions claimed to be faulty occurred. Rose, Interstate Libel
and Choice of Law: Proposals for the Future, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1515, 1540 (1979). At the very
least, the authors suggest that § 150 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
be amended to include as a factor in interest analysis a directive that the court determine the
defendant's liability according to the "standards established by the local law of the state where
the particular actions claims to be fault-producing had their occurrence." Id. at 1538 (emphasis
in original). See also Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1242 n.7 (5th Cir.
1980) (discussing possible application of the law of the situs of the publisher's operation in lieu
of the law of the plaintiff's domicile, without deciding issue), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
The authors suggest that the law of the defendant's situs of operation comports more closely to
the issues of fault that must be decided subsequent to New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). The courts' analyses in Wood and Levine, which give short shrift to any contact
with the defendant's forum, appear, therefore, somewhat superficially reasoned.
9. 733 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1984).
10. Id. at 1159.
11. Id. In concluding that Louisiana had the most significant relationship to the accident,
the court noted the following facts as significant: (1) Brown was residing in Louisiana, was
hired in Louisiana by a Louisiana employer, and would work in Louisiana for a Louisiana-
based principal; and (2) the accident occurred in Louisiana. Id. Brown's contacts with Texas,
his residency at the time of trial and his examination by two Texas doctors in preparation for
trial, were too minimal to influence the choice of law. Id. Brown presents a fairly clear case
for the application of Louisiana law. The circuit court's opinion, however, does not clarify
which contacts with Texas the district court relied on in applying Texas law. Brown, therefore,
may illustrate a choice of law determination that was complicated by use of the most signifi-
cant relationship test. Under previously recognized lex loci analyses applicable to contract and
tort, the district court would have been compelled to apply Louisiana law because Augen-
stein's indemnity contract was executed in Louisiana and the plaintiff's injury occurred in that
state. See id. at 1158-59.
1985]
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In Sosa v. M/V Lago Isabel'2 the court discussed federal choice of law
principles similar to those recognized under Texas choice of law rules. In
Sosa a Mexican seaman brought a personal injury action against his em-
ployer, and its vessel, for damages allegedly sustained as a result of the un-
seaworthiness of the defendant vessel. In appealing a judgment entered for
the plaintiff, the defendant contended that the district court was "clearly
erroneous" 13 in applying the law of the United States, rather than Mexico.
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's application of American law
was justified when considered under the relationship analysis test used in
maritime cases. 14 The court noted the following contacts with the United
States: (1) the ship involved in the incident forming the basis for the plain-
tiff's action regularly loaded cargo in Houston, Texas; (2) all operations for
the management of the vessel were conducted out of a Houston office; (3) ac-
tual maintenance of the vessel, other than that done by the crew, was per-
formed in Houston; and (4) the vessel's shipping agent was a corporation
located in Houston.t 5 As a result the court upheld in large part the judg-
ment that had been entered in favor of the plaintiff.16
Several cases decided during the survey period discussed the applicability
or viability of state substantive laws in cases decided primarily under federal
statutes. For example, in Scokin v. State17 the court applied a state statute of
limitations to the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EAHCA).' 8
The EAHCA directs that free, "appropriate" education shall be provided to
handicapped children and establishes a procedural scheme whereby parents
or guardians of handicapped children may appeal decisions relating to the
12. 736 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
13. The clearly erroneous standard of review seems to be a particularly appropriate stan-
dard for appellate review of choice of law determinations, due to the obvious mix of factual
and legal questions involved in a trial court's decision. The standard of review under Texas
choice of law rules has not as yet, however, been clearly enunciated. See generally Dalton,
supra note 2, at 399 & n.34 (advocating a clearer standard of appellate review in choice of law
cases).
14. 736 F.2d at 1031-32.
15. Id. at 1032. The court considered the following factors in deciding whether to apply
American or foreign law: (1) the place of the wrong; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the domicile of
the injured seaman; (4) the allegiance of the shipowner; (5) the place of contract; (6) the acces-
sibility of a foreign forum; (7) the law of the forum; and (8) the base of operations. Id. at 1031(citing Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 583-92 (1953)); see also In re Geophysical Serv., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1346, 1358-61
(S.D. Tex. 1984) (Canadian law applied under Lauritzen and case dismissed on grounds offorum non conveniens); Munusamy v. McClelland Eng'rs, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 149, 152-53, 159
(E.D. Tex. 1984) (United States law applied under Lauritzen and motion to dismiss on forum
non conveniens denied), affid mem. sub nom. In re McClelland Eng'rs, Inc., 739 F.2d 631 (5th
Cir. 1984); Cuevas v. Reading & Bates Corp., 577 F. Supp. 462, 465-70, 476-77 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (Phillipine law applied using Lauritzen test and case dismissed on grounds of forum non
conveniens). The Sosa court also noted that its review of the trial court's choice of law was de
novo. 736 F.2d at 1031 (citing Diaz v. Humboldt, 722 F.2d 1216, 1218 (5th Cir. 1984)).
16. The court vacated the district court's awards for rehabilitative expenses and pain and
suffering and remanded those issues for reconsideration at the trial court level. 736 F.2d at
1034-35.
17. 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1984).
18. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982).
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child's education.1 9 The EAHCA, however, is silent as to the appropriate
limitations period for such actions.20 Because the Scokin case was an action
brought under the procedural framework of the EAHCA, and because the
district court held that the plaintiff's claim for monetary and injunctive relief
under the EAHCA was barred by limitations, the Fifth Circuit was required
to determine the applicable limitations period.
In making its determination, the court noted that federal courts generally
will apply the limitations period applicable to an analogous action that is
provided by the law of the state in which the court sits. 21 The most analo-
gous state cause of action in Texas to a suit filed under the EAHCA, the
court stated, is an appeal from a state agency to a state court, which is gov-
erned by a thirty-day statute of limitations. 22 Because the court also deter-
mined that the thirty-day limitations period is inconsistent with the general
policies of the EAHCA, however, Texas's general two-year tort statute of
limitations23 was deemed applicable to cases heard in Texas and brought
under the EAHCA.24
Texas law, which had been held to preclude bifurcated trial on the issues
of liability and damages in personal injury actions,2 5 did not preclude a fed-
eral court from ordering a bifurcated trial of those issues in Rosales v. Honda
Motor Co.2 6 In Rosales, a Texas diversity action that had been removed to
federal court by the defendant, the plaintiff sued for personal injuries alleg-
edly caused by a product defect. The plaintiff appealed from a take-nothing
judgment on the ground that the district court had ordered separate trials
under federal rule 42(b)2 7 on the issues of liability and damages. On appeal
the plaintiff's only contention was that Texas substantive law entitled him to
a unified trial of those issues. The Rosales court initially noted that it would
not reach the issue of whether, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,2 8 it
would be required to give effect to the state substantive rule if the subject
matter of the substantive rule was outside the scope of the federal procedural
rule.29 The court stated that rule 42 is consistently interpreted as sufficiently
broad to permit separate trials of the issues of liability and damages in per-
sonal injuries suits; thus, the federal rule clearly encompasses the same sub-
ject matter as the state law prohibiting bifurcated trials.30 In rejecting the
plaintiff's contention that he was entitled to a single trial under state law, the
court determined that "a rule authorizing or prohibiting a bifurcated trial of
19. Id. §§ 1411, 1415.
20. 723 F.2d at 436.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
23. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
24. 723 F.2d at 438.
25. See Eubank v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967); Bey v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362,
363, 311 S.W.2d 648, 649 (1958).
26. 726 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1984).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
28. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).




liability-damage issues" is not clearly either substantive or procedural.3'
The state's characterization of its own rule as substantive, therefore, must
nevertheless yield to the strong presumptive validity of the federal proce-
dural rule, which will be upheld as controlling a federal court.3
2
In Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Construction Co. 33 the
Fifth Circuit held that the no-waiver provision of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) 34 was preempted by a federal
statute. 35 In Commerce Park a contractor and an owner had executed a
contract for the construction of an office warehouse project and included in
the contract a provision that disputes would be settled through arbitration.
After disputes had arisen between the parties the contractor filed a demand
for arbitration, and the owner subsequently filed suit in state court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the matters sought to be arbitrated were not arbi-
trable. The state court action was removed to federal court, and that court
stayed the action pending determination of the arbitration. From the federal
court's stay order the owner appealed to the Fifth Court.
The choice of law question before the Commerce Park court centered on
the interrelationship of the DTPA and the Federal Arbitration Act.36 The
owner contended that its claims brought under the DTPA were non-arbitra-
ble because the no-waiver provisions of the DTPA guaranteed judicial re-
dress of alleged violations of the statute. The court rejected that
contention, 37 relying upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Southland Corp. v. Keating.38 The Commerce Park court held that the par-
31. Id. at 262 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
32. 726 F.2d at 262.
33. 729 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1984).
34. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Section 17.42 of
the DTPA provides that a waiver by a consumer of the subchapter's provisions is contrary to
public policy, unenforceable, and void. Id. § 17.42. Section 17.50 of the DTPA provides the
remedies for violations thereof, including an award of treble damages in certain instances. Id.
§ 17.50.
35. 729 F.2d at 338.
36. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Section 2 of the Act provides that:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an ex-
isting controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2. Section 3 of the Act provides that:
[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with
such arbitration.
Id. § 3.
37. 729 F.2d at 337.
38. 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984). In Keating the plaintiffs brought suit in Califor-
nia state court pursuant to a California statute containing a no-waiver provision similar to that
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ties, by agreeing to arbitrate, had invoked the federal arbitration statute and
that the DTPA waiver provision, if applied, would abrogate section 2 of the
arbitration act.39 The court noted that this abrogation would violate the
supremacy clause. 4°
Just as the Fifth Circuit in Commerce Park held that a federal statute
preempted state substantive law, the court in Boehringer-Mannheim Diag-
nostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.4 1 held that a United States
treaty preempted state law and, therefore, precluded a recovery of attorneys
fees under a state statute.42 The Boehringer-Mannheim case arose under the
Warsaw Convention, 43 an agreement that limits air carriers' liability to pas-
sengers in international travel and customers sending international cargo.
The court held that the treaty preempted the plaintiff's action to the extent
that the action was based upon state negligence law.44 The plaintiff had
attempted to ship cargo with the defendant, and when that cargo was dam-
aged the plaintiff brought an action seeking to recover for the damaged
items. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff's damages were limited by the
Warsaw Convention and that an award of attorneys' fees under state law
was improper because that law had been preempted. 4
5
At least three decisions during the survey period gave effect to a forum
selection clause agreed upon by the parties, one of the few remaining in-
stances in which courts in Texas will not apply the most significant relation-
ship test.46 In Bergstrom Air Force Base Federal Credit Union v. Mellon
Mortgage, Inc. - East4 7 the Tyler court of appeals gave effect to a forum
selection clause contained in a contract for the sale of certain government
mortgage bonds.4 8 In Queen Noor, Inc. v. McGinn49 the court enforced a
contained in the DTPA. As in Commerce Park, the parties in Keating had included an arbitra-
tion agreement in their contract. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted the no-waiver provision of the California statute and that the claims brought under
that statute were, therefore, arbitrable. 104 S. Ct. at 860-61, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 15-16.
39. 729 F.2d at 337-38.
40. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. XI, cl. 2.
41. 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 458-59; see TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
43. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
44. 737 F.2d at 458-59.
45. Id. at 459. In Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 584 F. Supp. 899, 901 (S.D. Tex. 1984),
the court determined that Texas community property laws were not preempted by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982) (ERISA). In Eichel-
berger a wife was awarded an undivided one-half interest in her husband's accrued monthly
pension under the terms of a divorce decree. The pension fund had been organized pursuant to
ERISA. The court, citing federal and state authorities, concluded that ERISA had not pre-
empted the Texas community property laws. 584 F. Supp. at 901.
46. In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984), the Texas Supreme
Court stated that choice of law questions in cases based upon contract would henceforth be
determined using the most significant relationship test. Id. at 421. The court specifically ex-
cepted from application of the most significant relationship test those situations in which the
parties' contract contains a valid forum selection clause. Id.; see Dalton, supra note 2, at 396
n.3.
47. 674 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 848. The court stated that the contract provided that the agreement was
deemed to have been made in New York and would be construed and the rights and liabilities
19851
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forum selection clause notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention that the
provision should be vitiated due to fraud.50 In its opinion, however, the
court stated that courts generally look with disfavor upon forum selection
clauses. 51
Perhaps the most interesting case decided during the survey period and
dealing with the parties' selection of applicable law was Austin Elcon Corp. v.
Avco Corp.52 In Avco the parties had executed an agreement, but had not
included in their contract a forum selection clause. The district court, ap-
plying Texas choice of law principles, held that because the parties both ar-
gued for application of Texas law, it would follow the contracting parties'
lead and apply Texas law.53 The court, therefore, gave effect to an ex post
facto choice of law by the parties.
II. JUDGMENTS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution54 has
continued to generate cases in Texas concerning the validity, enforcement,
or effect of judgments or orders. Cases decided during the survey period
involved challenges by non-residents to Texas courts' default judgments and
the mechanical requisites of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act 55 and the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition
Act.56
A. Default Judgments-Challenges to Jurisdiction
Last year's survey article discussed the Corpus Christi court of appeals'
of the parties determined in accordance with New York laws; therefore, New York law con-
trolled matters of substantive law and Texas law controlled matters of procedural law. Id.
49. 578 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
50. Id. at 221.
51. Id. The court quoted language from the Supreme Court's decision in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), in which the Court stated that a party resisting
application of a forum selection clause must demonstrate either that the litigation in the agreed
forum would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause is unenforceable due to fraud or
overreaching. 578 F. Supp. at 221 (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972)). The McGinn court, however, was considering a forum selection clause that recited
both the applicable state law and the jurisdiction to whom the parties would agree to subject
themselves, "whatever their domicile may be." 578 F. Supp. at 219. The jurisdictional aspects
of the provision might, therefore, provide some insight into the court's hostility toward such an
agreement.
52. 590 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
53. Id. at 512. The court stated that the parties briefed only Texas law and assumed that
it governed the controversy; the court requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs dis-
cussing choice of law, but both parties argued that Texas law applied. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The full faith and credit clause provides that "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each States to the. . . Judicial Proceedings of every other State."
Id.
55. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The Uniform En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments Act delineates the procedure to obtain full faith and credit in
Texas on a foreign judgment.
56. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-6 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The Uniform For-
eign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act delineates when a foreign country's money
judgment is conclusive and entitled to full faith and credit in Texas.
[Vol. 39
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analysis in Fuhrer v. Rinyu, 57 which generally explained the treatment Texas
courts give to default judgments, both foreign and domestic.58 In its analysis
the Fuhrer court included among the rules for attacking default judgments
one providing that no presumptions can be indulged in favoring the judg-
ment recitations in a direct attack on a Texas default judgment. 59 Three
cases during this survey period exemplified the application of that principle.
The first of these was Roland Communications, Inc. v. American Communi-
cations Corpus Christi, Inc. ,60 in which the plaintiff filed an action against a
nonresident defendant complaining of breaches of contract and warranties
and violations of the DTPA.61 The plaintiff attempted to obtain service
upon the defendant by serving the Secretary of State of Texas pursuant to
the Business Corporation Act.62 Although a statement from the trial judge
and a notation on the docket sheet indicated that the Secretary of State had
forwarded a copy of the process to the defendant, no certificate to that effect
from the Secretary of State or any other competent evidence thereof was
available. The court, therefore, held that the trial court was never shown to
have acquired jurisdiction over that defendant. 63 Because the defendant was
attacking the default judgment by way of writ of error, the trial court's reci-
tations, standing alone, were held insufficient to confer jurisdiction."4
While the preceding case involved problems of proof under the Fuhrer
rule, the remaining two dealt with pleading deficiencies. In Franecke v. Dol-
enz 65 the plaintiff failed to plead that the defendant was a nonresident natu-
ral person. Because any attempt to use a form of substituted service requires
strict compliance with the enabling statute,66 the appellate court held the
plaintiff to the Texas Supreme Court's requirements set forth in Whitney v. L
& L Realty Corp.,67 which compels the plaintiff to: "(1) plead facts that, if
true, would require the defendant to answer; and (2) prove that the defend-
ant, in fact, was served in the required manner."'68 The defendant's applica-
tion for writ of error was granted because of the plaintiff's failure to plead
that the defendant was a nonresident natural person, one of the facts that
must be pleaded before article 203 lb69 can invoke the substituted service.70
A similar pleading defect was the basis of the Austin court of appeals'
reversal of a default judgment in Steve Tyrell Productions, Inc. v. Ray.7 1 The
plaintiff in Ray failed to allege that any of the acts complained of were com-
57. 647 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
58. Dalton, supra note 2, at 402-07.
59. 647 S.W.2d at 317 (citing McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965)).
60. 662 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
61. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
62. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 810 (Vernon 1980).
63. 662 S.W.2d at 147.
64. Id.
65. 668 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ dism'd).
66. Id. at 482-83.
67. 500 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex. 1973).
68. 668 S.W.2d at 482.
69. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1984).
70. 668 S.W.2d at 482-83.
71. 674 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
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mitted in or related to Texas. The Ray court, therefore, held that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to grant the default judgment.72
Of these three cases, the first two were attacks by writ of error and the
third was an appeal. As these were all direct attacks, the rule of "absolute
verity" 73 could not be applied and the defendants were all successful in hav-
ing the default judgments set aside. Interestingly, however, all three of those
cases were remanded, rather than reversed. As the Franecke court noted,
since the defendant appeared to attack the judgment he was presumed to
have entered his appearance, 74 even though the appearance was in the appel-
late court only. Consequently, by engaging in a direct attack, upon a default
judgment complaining of deficiencies in pleading or proof, by either writ of
error or appeal, a nonresident defendant subjects himself to the jurisdiction
of Texas' courts for further proceedings in the cause. The Ray court made a
general observation distinguishing this treatment from that afforded when a
special appearance has been improperly overruled. The court noted that
when a trial court erroneously overrules a nonresident's properly made and
litigated special appearance based upon lack of amenability to process, then
the appellate court must reverse the judgment and require that the case be
dismissed.75 If the appeal concerns a defect in the mode of service, however,
then the appellate court must reverse the judgment and remand for a trial on
the merits.76
In Ray a default judgment was taken following the defendants' failure
timely to appear and answer. 77 Three days after the entry of that judgment,
the defendants filed a special appearance and, eighteen days later, filed a
motion for new trial. The motion for new trial was brought on for hearing
and was overruled without any specific reference to the attempted special
appearance.78 The court held that by participating in the hearing on the
motion for new trial, the defendants waived their special appearance. 79 The
defendants, therefore, were held to have entered a general appearance and to
have thereby subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts.80
The court, however, chose not to address whether a special appearance can
properly be filed by a nonresident defendant after rendition of a judgment.8 '
B. Finality, Conclusiveness, Res Judicata, and Collateral Estoppel
In three opinions the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has limited and care-
fully defined the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect that a federal
72. Id. at 434, 437.
73. The rule of absolute verity is discussed in more detail at Dalton, supra note 2, at 404-
07.
74. 668 S.W.2d at 483.
75. 674 S.W.2d at 435.
76. Id. Considering the other cases cited in the text, this analysis apparently applies
equally to cases involving failures to prove necessary jurisdictional facts.
77. Id. at 433.
78. Id. at 436-37.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id. at 436-37.
81. Id. at 436.
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bankruptcy court must give state court judgments in making determinations
as to the nondischargeability of those obligations. In In re Schuler8 2 the
court was presented with the argument by a creditor that a default judg-
ment, which recited that it was based upon a debt for obtaining items by
false pretenses, should be recognized as proof of the nondischargeability of
the debt by application of collateral estoppel principles. The court rejected
that argument,8 3 basically relying upon the United State Supreme Court's
opinion in Brown v. Felsen.8 4 In doing so, however, the Fifth Circuit court
applied the Brown analysis to express the conclusion that "collateral estoppel
may apply [in a bankruptcy proceeding] to subsidiary facts actually litigated
and necessarily decided [in the state court judgment].185 The corollary to
that position that the Shuler court enunciated and actually applied is that,
when the state court judgment does not contain detailed facts sufficient to
meet the federal test of nondischargeability, the bankruptcy court may ig-
nore conclusory statements in the judgment concerning the nature of the
cause of action and hold that the debt is dischargeable.8 6 The court specifi-
cally noted that the competing federal interest of the bankruptcy laws is a
proper reason for imposing this type of limitation upon the application of
full faith and credit principles.8 7
On July 9, 1984, the Fifth Circuit court decided, in conjunction, In Re
Allman8" and In Re Poston.89 The court adopted and applied by reference in
Poston the reasoning of its opinion in Allman. These opinions rely substan-
tially on the prior opinion in Shuler,9° along with the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Brown v. Felsen.91 The court refined and more clearly expressed its
Shuler holding as follows:
[I]n cases where the state court judgment '[does] not contain detailed
facts sufficient as findings to meet the federal test of non-dis-
chargeability,' leaving the bankruptcy court 'unable to discern from the
record the subsidiary facts upon which the false-pretense allegation was
made,' the bankruptcy court may properly refuse to accord collateral
estoppel effect to the state court judgment.92
The court held in Allman that, because the judgment had no specific reci-
tal with regard to fraud or false pretenses, the bankruptcy court properly
concluded that the state court's judgment was limited to a statement of the
82. 722 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 85, 83 L. Ed. 2d. 32 (1984).
83. 722 F.2d at 1254.
84. 442 U.S. 127 (1979). In Brown the Supreme Court held that res judicata principles do
not prohibit a bankruptcy court from determining the dischargeability of an obligation under
the federal bankruptcy law. Id. at 138-39. The Supreme Court also observed that if a state
court determines a factual issue using standards identical to the standards that the bankruptcy
court uses, then collateral estoppel bars relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court. Id.
at 139 n.lO.
85. 722 F.2d at 1256.
86. Id. at 1257.
87. Id. at 1258 n.10.
88. 735 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1984).
89. 735 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1984).
90. See Poston, 735 F.2d at 868; Allman, 735 F.2d at 864.
91. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
92. 735 F.2d at 865 (quoting In re Schuler, 722 F.2d at 1257-58).
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validity of the indebtedness,93 that collateral estoppel principles did not con-
trol a determination of the issue of dischargeability, 94 and that the debt was
dischargeable. 95 In Poston, rather than finding that the state court judgment
had not expressly referenced the issues of fraud and false pretenses, the court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that recitals in the state court
judgment concerning fraud and false pretenses were not factually supported
in the record. 96 The bankruptcy court, therefore, properly refused to accord
collateral estoppel to the state court judgment in making its determination
that the debt was dischargeable. 97 These opinions indicate that, in order to
successfully contend in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding that a state
court judgment is nondischargeable, a creditor should, when seeking and
obtaining that judgment, be certain that: (1) the record contains ample fac-
tual evidence to support findings of fraud or false pretenses; (2) the judgment
contains findings of fraud or false pretenses; and (3) the judgment contains
recitals that it is based upon such findings of fraud or false pretenses. If all
three of these are present, the Fifth Circuit court has indicated that those
facts actually litigated and necessary to the state court's decision should not
be reopened without a compelling reason to avoid injustice. 98
Conlon v. Heckler99 was a Fifth Circuit court opinion addressing the en-
forceability of those portions of a Texas divorce decree that purported to
determine the paternity of a child. The case represents an interesting effort
to obtain an adjudication of paternity under circumstances in which the al-
leged father was not in Texas. While stationed in Texas with the United
States Army, Michael Conlon lived with Judy Ellis for approximately two
weeks during the latter part of June 1968. At the end of June 1968, Michael
left Judy and returned to his original home state of Vermont where he mar-
ried in 1970, had children by that marriage in 1970 and 1974, and died in
1975. In March of 1969, however, Judy had a child, Trisha, back in Texas.
In early 1970 Judy filed an action for divorce in Texas, alleging that she and
Michael had been married and that Trisha was an issue of that marriage.
Although Michael was personally served in that action, he made no appear-
ance. Prior to Michael's marriage in Vermont, the Texas court granted
Judy's request for a divorce and, in that decree, determined that Trisha was
Michael's child and ordered that the name on her birth certificate be
changed to reflect "Conlon" as her surname. 1°°
After Michael's death in 1975 his wife in Vermont and their two children
applied for and began receiving federal social security survivor's benefits.
Judy, on behalf of Trisha, also sought and received federal social security
survivor's benefits, which resulted in a decrease in the benefits payable to the
93. 735 F.2d at 865 n.2, 866.
94. Id. at 866.
95. Id.
96. 735 F.2d at 869.
97. Id. at 869-70.
98. In re Schuler, 722 F.2d at 1256 (quoting Franks v. Thomason, 4 Bankr. 814, 820-21
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)).
99. 719 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1983).
100. Michael's Vermont marriage occurred subsequent to the Texas divorce.
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Vermont wife and children. The Vermont wife challenged the payment to
Trisha, and the final administrative determination upheld that challenge.
Judy subsequently filed suit in a Texas district court to have that administra-
tive determination reversed; her appeal from an adverse summary judgment
resulted in the subject opinion.' 0 '
Judy's principal claim on appeal was that the Social Security Administra-
tion was required to give full faith and credit to the Texas divorce decree in
all its particulars, including the determination that Trisha was Michael's
child. The Fifth Circuit court found that the Texas domestic relations court
had never acquired personal jurisdiction over Michael.10 2 The court did not
dispute the validity of the divorce decree insofar as it purported to sever a
marital bond between Judy and Michael, 10 3 because Judy's Texas domicile
gave the court in rem jurisdiction to grant her a divorce without in personam
jurisdiction over Michael. 104 The court, nevertheless, refused to enforce or
give effect to that portion of the divorce decree that purported to determine
that Trisha was Michael's child.' 05 This determination was made based
upon application of the "divisible divorce" concept derived from the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Estin v. Estin.10 6 In Conlon the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that a determination that Michael was the father of Trisha
would adversely affect his personal and property rights to determine, inter
alia, the distribution and descent of his estate upon his death., 07 That por-
tion of the Texas divorce decree that purported to determine that Trisha was
Michael's child was, therefore, held not to be entitled to full faith and credit
and federal social security survivor's benefits were held properly denied to
Trisha. 10 8
C. Foreign Judgment Enforcement Statutes
The two principal Texas statutes dealing with enforcement of foreign
judgments, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act' °9
(UEFJA) and the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition
101. 719 F.2d at 792.
102. Id. at 794-95.
103. Id. at 788. The court did, however, refer to the administrative law judge's legal con-
clusion that even under Texas law no marriage existed. Id. at 792 n.2.
104. Id. at 798.
105. Id. at 798-99.
106. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). The Supreme Court determined in Estin that, in a case in which
personal jurisdiction has not been obtained over an out-of-state respondent, any portion of a
divorce decree that purports to affect that respondent's property interests or personal rights is
not enforceable under principles of full faith and credit. This concept is called "divisible
divorce."
107. 719 F.2d at 797.
108. Id. at 798-99. In a footnote the court recognized the apparently insurmountable statu-
tory and procedural hurdles facing Judy in 1970. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 108 had no
jurisdictional effect, and article 203 lb could not be used for jurisdictional purposes in a pater-
nity suit. Id. at 794-95 nn.5-7. The court further noted that § 11.051 of the Texas Family
Code, adopted in 1975, may now provide that jurisdictional foundation that was not available
in 1970. Id. at 795 n.7; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
109. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984); see supra note 55.
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Act 10 (UFCMJRA), are both reasonably short, relatively clear, and fairly
precise. Although neither is particularly complicated, several cases during
the survey period addressed the procedural requirements of these acts and
the consequences of failing to follow their statutory schemes.
In Northwest Sign Co. v. Jack H. Brown & Co. 111 the supreme court re-
versed the Dallas court of appeals' opinion 1 2 denying enforcement of an
Idaho judgment under the UEFJA.113 In an earlier opinion of the Dallas
court of appeals in this same case, however, the court discussed the authenti-
cation requirements of the UEFJA. 1 14 Northwest had originally filed the
Idaho judgment in a Dallas district court in April 1982, with an affidavit
reciting that "Signgraphics, Inc." was the defendant. The affidavit, however,
did not mention Jack H. Brown & Co., or its assumed name, or Sign-
graphics. This defect was apparently brought to the attention of Northwest
by the trial court, and in March 1983 Northwest filed an identical copy of
the Idaho judgment with an affidavit stating that the proper defendants were
doing business under the assumed name of Signgraphics. In April Jack H.
Brown & Co. filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled.
When Jack H. Brown & Co. appealed, Northwest filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal for want of jurisdiction, alleging that the UEFJA afforded the
Idaho judgment the same effect as a Texas judgment and, therefore, Jack H.
Brown & Co.'s motion for a new trial should have been filed within thirty
days after Northwest originally filed the Idaho judgment. The court rejected
Northwest's motion, holding that under the UEFJA the Idaho judgment
was entitled to the same effect as a Texas judgment only if Northwest com-
plied with the UEFJA's requirements of authentication and filing of an affi-
davit properly naming the defendants. 1 5 Because the affidavit filed in April
1982 did not name Jack H. Brown & Co., it was defective as to such party;
since Northwest had not complied with the UEFJA, the filing did not start
the timetable for the filing of a motion for new trial. 1 16
110. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-6 (Vernon Supp. 1984); see supra note 56.
111. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 110, 111 (Nov. 21, 1984).
112. 677 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984).
113. In these two opinions the issue in controversy was whether the entity against which
the judgment was sought to be enforced in Texas had actually been served with process in the
original Idaho lawsuit. Two Texas corporations were involved: (1) Signgraphics, Inc. and(2) Jack H. Brown & Co., which did business under the assumed name of "Signgraphics."
Each corporation's registered agent for service of process was Jack H. Brown. 28 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. at 110. The record reflected that the Idaho suit was against Signgraphics and that ser-
vice of process was had upon Signgraphics by delivering the service to its registered agent. Id.
at 110. The Texas Supreme Court granted Northwest's application for writ of error, reversed
the court of appeals, and affirmed the trial court judgment enforcing the Idaho judgment be-
cause the service return reflected service only on Signgraphics, not Signgraphics, Inc. The fact
was erroneously stated by the court of appeals. See 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 111; 677 S.W.2d at
137. Since Signgraphics was admittedly an assumed name for Jack H. Brown & Co. and under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28 suit may be brought in an assumed name, the supreme court
held that service was proper and that the Idaho judgment was enforceable against Jack H.
Brown & Co. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 110-11.
114. Jack H. Brown & Co. v. Northwest Sign Co., 665 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ).
115. Id. at 221.
116. See id. at 221-22.
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In Allen v. Tenant' 17 the Houston court of appeals granted a writ of man-
damus against a district court that had entered an order enforcing an Eng-
lish judgment under the UFCMJRA. In Allen the plaintiffs sought
enforcement of their judgment by using the simplified filing option, rather
than the adversary proceeding option. All requirements of the Act were
complied with except that the clerk did not mail notice of the filing of the
English judgment to the debtor." 8 The creditor claimed that the debtor's
remedy was limited to a bill of review and that mandamus would, therefore,
be improper. The court rejected that argument, citing Brown v. Northwest
Sign Co. for the proposition that a foreign judgment has the same effect as a
Texas judgment only when a creditor complies with the statutory require-
ments for its recognition. 19 Because the statutory requirements were not
met, the district court had no power to enforce the English judgment, and all
orders pertaining thereto were held to be void.' 20
In Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya)121 and Norkan Lodge Co. v. Gil-
lum ' 22 two different Dallas federal district courts were presented with very
similar arguments by debtors attempting to avoid enforcement of foreign
judgments. In each case the debtor alleged that enforcement was barred
under section 5(b)(7) of the UFCMJRA, which provides that "[a] foreign
country judgment need not be recognized if. . .it is established that the
foreign country in which the judgment was rendered does not recognize
judgments rendered in this state. . .. ,123 The Hunt court concluded that
the legislature had placed the burden of proof on the party that opposed the
recognition of the foreign money judgment. 124 The Norkan court, by impli-
cation, also concluded that the burden of proof on this issue falls upon the
alleged debtor.' 25
The conclusion that can be drawn from these opinions, therefore, is that,
if a debtor intends to attempt to avoid enforcement of a foreign country
money judgment by claiming nonrecognition under the UFCMJRA, he not
only should plead such as a defense, but also should offer some evidence,
either by affidavit' 26 or by documentation of that country's rejection of a
Texas money judgment. 27 Since this portion of the UFCMJRA is discre-
tionary with the court,' 2 8 however, even these efforts may not prevent recog-
nition and enforcement.
117. 678 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
118. The UFCMJRA's procedural requirements are contained in the UEFJA. Id. at 744;
see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The UFCMJRA gives
the creditor the option of mailing the notice and filing proof of that mailing with the clerk.
119. 678 S.W.2d at 744.
120. Id.
121. 580 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
122. 587 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
123. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-6, § 5(b)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
124. 580 F. Supp. at 307.
125. 587 F. Supp. at 1461.
126. In Hunt the creditors offered an affidavit from the English barrister that an English
court would recognize the Texas money judgment.
127. The Norkan court appears to make this suggestion.




The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, 129 as interpreted in the Texas
Supreme Court's second opinion in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. 130 (Hall II), once again provides the focus of the jurisdiction
section of this survey article 3 1 because the United States Supreme Court
reversed that opinion. 132 The significance of the Supreme Court's decision,
however, lies not in the portion of its opinion addressing the reach of the
Texas long-arm statute, but, rather, in that portion discussing the permissi-
ble scope of state jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
In reversing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Hall II, the United
States Supreme Court accepted the Texas court's holding that the state's
long-arm statute reaches as far as the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States States Constitution 33 permits. 134 The
Court, nevertheless, found that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in
this case would be inconsistent with constitutional requirements. 135 The na-
ture of the defendant's contacts with Texas, the court stated, were not the
kind of continuous and systematic contacts necessary to support jurisdiction
when the cause of action did not arise out of or relate to such contacts. 136
Contrary to the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Hall II, the number
of contacts that the nonresident defendant has with the forum does not
solely determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is proper, but the quali-
tative nature of those contacts must also be considered.
Article 2031b, the Texas long-arm statute, provides for the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the underlying
cause of action arises out of the nonresident's contacts with the state. 37
Prior to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Hall II, the prevailing view
among lower courts in Texas, as well as in the Fifth Circuit, was that the
"arising out of' language of article 203 lb should be read and applied liter-
ally to require a nexus between the cause of action asserted and the defend-
129. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1984).
130. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). The
court withdrew its first opinion, which is located at 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190 (Feb. 24, 1982).
131. See Dalton, supra note 2, at 411-20; Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 397, 397-403 (1982).
132. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1874, 80 L. Ed.
2d 404, 414 (1984).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134. 104 S. Ct. at 1871 & n.7, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 410 & n.7.
135. Id. at 1872-73, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411-12.
136. Id. at 1872, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411.
137. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964), provides:
Any. . . non-resident natural person that engages in business in this State...
and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated
agent upon whom service may be made upon causes of action arising out of such
business done in this State, the act or acts of engaging in such business within
this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such . . . non-resi-
dent natural person of the Secretary of State. . . as agent upon whom service of
process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of such busi-
ness done in this State, wherein such. . . non-resident natural person is a party
or is to be made a party.
[Vol. 39
CONFLICT OF LAWS
ant's contacts with Texas.1 38 Despite that clear language in the statute, the
Texas Supreme Court in Hall II eliminated the nexus requirement in situa-
tions in which the nonresident defendant is present in the forum through
numerous contacts that satisfy the demands of the due process test. 13 9 In
the court's opinion, when the nonresident defendant has had numerous con-
tacts with the state, the reach of article 203 lb is coextensive with that of the
due process clause.140
The United States Supreme Court in Hall declined to decide whether the
Texas Supreme Court had correctly interpreted 203 lb because such a deci-
sion was not within their province; the Court, therefore, accepted the Texas
Supreme Court's holding that the limits of the Texas statute are coextensive
with those of the due process clause. 141 Thus, the only question before the
United States Supreme Court in Hall was whether the due process clause
allowed Texas courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 142 (Helicol). The issue before
the Supreme Court, therefore, really only concerned the limits of constitu-
tional due process and the constitutional limits to the Texas long-arm
statute.
The Hall case arose out of the crash of a helicopter provided by Helicol to
transport men and supplies to and from a job site in the jungles of Peru. The
parties did not dispute that the claims against Helicol did not arise out of
and were not related to Helicol's activities within Texas. 4 3 Even though the
cause 6f action did not arise out of or relate to Helicol's activities within
Texas, the Court found that subjecting the corporation to in personam juris-
diction would not offend due process if the corporation's activities in the
forum state were of a continuous and systematic nature.144 The Court re-
ferred to this power as the exercise of "general jurisdiction" by the state over
the defendant.1 45 In contrast, the Court stated, "specific jurisdiction" exists
when the suit does arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the
forum. 146
138. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1266 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Figari,
Grave & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 289, 290
(1983).
139. 638 S.W.2d at 872. For a further discussion of Hall II, see Dalton, supra note 2, at
415-16.
140. 638 S.W.2d at 872.
141. 104 S. Ct. at 1871 n.7, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 410 n.7.
142. Id. at 1872, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 410.
143. Id. at 1872-73, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411. Contra 104 S. Ct. at 1877 n.3, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 418
n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1872, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411.
145. Id. at 1872 n.9, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411 n.9.
146. Id. at 1872 n.8, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 411 n.8. For a detailed discussion of general versus
specific jurisdiction, see von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1135-79 (1966). Although the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hall II did not speak in terms of general versus specific jurisdiction, the court's analysis
in eliminating the nexus requirement contained in article 2031b in cases in which the defend-
ant has numerous contacts with Texas is substantially similar to the Supreme Court's analysis
limiting it opinion to the exercise of general jurisdiction by the state. When read in this con-
text, by extending the reach of the Texas long-arm statute to the constitutional limits of due
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In reaching the decision that Texas could not exercise general jurisdiction
over Helicol, the Court first analyzed Helicol's activities in Texas. 147
Helicol's contacts with Texas consisted of: (1) sending an executive officer to
Houston to negotiate a contract; (2) accepting checks drawn on Houston
banks; (3) purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from Bell
Helicopter; and (4) sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort Worth for
training. 148 The Court did not find these contacts to constitute the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts necessary for the state
to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 149 The Court
then analyzed the contacts consisting of the purchases and related training
trips, which the Texas Supreme Court focused on in finding sufficient con-
tacts to support jurisdiction over the defendant.' 50
The Court, relying on a case 15' that had been decided before the expan-
sion of personal jurisdiction heralded by International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 1 5 2 held that such purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, were
not enough to warrant the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident corporation in a cause not related to those purchases. 153 The fact
that Helicol sent personnel to Texas for training in connection with the
purchase of helicopter equipment also did not, in the Court's opinion, en-
hance the nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum statute.' 54
Thus, Helicol's contacts with Texas were found insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and,
accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas was reversed.' 55
In taking this action, the Court appears to have narrowed the constitu-
tionally permissible scope of in personam jurisdiction. Justice Brennan was
concerned with this change, and he dissented because he found "troubling
the implications that might be drawn" from the Court's opinion concerning
limitations on the amount and type of contacts that will satisfy the constitu-
tional minimums.' 5 6 Whether the Court's decision is so far reaching as to
process, the Texas Supreme Court in Hall II clearly did not entirely eliminate the nexus re-
quirement contained in the statute. See Dalton, supra note 2, at 416-20.
147. 104 S. Ct. at 1873, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 412.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1874, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 413.
151. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923). In Rosenberg the
Court held that the purchase of merchandise from New York wholesalers on a regular basis,
along with occasional trips by an employee to New York for that purpose, was not sufficient to
support the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident. Id. at 518.
152. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a discussion of the expansion of in personam jurisdiction
since International Shoe, see Note, The Texas Long-Arm Statute After Hall v. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. Will Texas Become a Magnet Forum?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1221,
1223-28 (1983).
153. 104 S. Ct. at 1874, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 413.
154. Id. (the training was part of the package of goods and services that Helicol purchased
from Bell).
155. Id., 80 L. Ed. 2d at 414.
156. Id. at 1875, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 414-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criti-
cized the Court for relying on Rosenberg, a 1923 decision of dubious validity given the Court's
subsequent expansion of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1876, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 415. The dissent
acknowledged that Rosenberg was factually on point, but opined that the analysis of the Court
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place "severe limitations" on the exercise of in personam jurisdiction is un-
clear at this time. The effect will, of course, depend on how the opinion is
interpreted in the future by the United States Supreme Court and the lower
courts.15 7 Nevertheless, the Court's trend of expanding the permissible
was flawed because it failed to ascertain whether the narrow view of in personam jurisdiction
that the Rosenberg court adopted comports with the transformation of the national economy
that has occurred since 1923. Id., 80 L. Ed. 2d at 415-16. In Justice Brennan's view, the
decision of the Court was contrary to the trend toward expanding the permissible scope of
jurisdiction over nonresidents that has become both necessary and desirable because of the
increased frequency with which foreign corporations pursue commercial transactions through-
out the various states. Id. at 1876, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 416. The dissent stated that the Court's
conclusion that Helicol's sending of management personnel and pilots to Texas did not "en-
hance the nature of Helicol's contacts" completely ignored the realities of a modern economy.
Id. at 1877 & n.2, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 417 & n.2. Justice Brennan also disagreed with the Court's
view of the case as one involving a question of general jurisdiction. Id. at 1877-78 & n.3, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 418 & n.3. According to Justice Brennan, this limiting of the decision to "an asser-
tion of general jurisdiction" by the Texas courts over a foreign defendant failed to recognize
any distinction between contacts that are "related to" the underlying cause of action and those
that "give rise to" the cause of action. Id. at 1877-78, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 418. The dissent argued
that, despite the fact that the cause of action did not formally arise out of specific activities
initiated by Helicol in Texas, the claim was significantly related to Helicol's contacts with
Texas because: (1) the negotiations that took place in Texas led to the contact by which
Helicol agreed to provide the transportation services being used at the time of the crash;
(2) Helicol purchased the helicopter involved in the crash in Texas; and (3) the pilot whose
negligence was alleged to have caused the crash was actually trained in Texas. Id. at 1878, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 418-19. Justice Brennan, therefore, found that the substantial relationship be-
tween the contacts and the cause of action would support an assertion of specific jurisdiction
by the Texas courts in this case. Id.
In Justice Brennan's view, the Court's opinion could be read as limiting a forum's specific
jurisdiction to cases in which the cause of action arose out of the nonresident's contacts with
the state. Id. at 1879, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 419. If this reading reflected the Court's holding, the
dissent argued, the Court had lost sight of the "ultimate inquiry" as set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny, which is: whether subjecting a nonresident corporate defendant to the
jurisdiction of the state when that defendant has purposely availed itself of the benefits and
obligations of the particular forum is fair and reasonable. Id. The dissent concluded that the
Court, by relying on a precedent with invalid premises and by refusing to recognize any dis-
tinction between controversies the "relate to" as opposed "arise out of" the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum, may be limiting severely the type and amount of contacts that will satisfy
the constitutional minimum. Id. at 1875, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 415.
157. Although the dissent argued that the Court has "lost sight of the ultimate inquiry,"
the interpretation of the lower courts thus far appears to be that the Court has not abandoned
this inquiry, but, rather, has set forth two different tests, depending on whether the forum is
asserting general or specific jurisdiction. This position has been taken by two federal district
courts that have had occasion to interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Hall II. In Jones v.
North Am. Aerodynamics, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 657 (D. Me. 1984), the federal district court
stated that Hall and other Supreme Court decisions require a three-step analysis. Id. at 659.
First, the defendant must have some contact with the forum state. Second, the suit must arise
out of or be related to defendant's forum contacts. Third, if the suit arises out of or relates to
the defendant's forum contacts, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation must form a fair and reasonable foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction; if the
cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the defendant's forum contacts, the court
considers only the relationship between the forum and the defendant. Id. The federal district
court in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Buffalo Rock Co., 593 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ala. 1984),
interpreted Hall similarly, requiring continuous and systematic contacts for the court to ac-
quire jurisdiction over the defendant when the litigation is unrelated to the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum. Id. at 1561-62.
Another reading of Hall II is that, in an effort to simplify the three-step analysis, the Court
is willing to assume that exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident is fair and reasonable when
the nonresident's contacts are continuous and systematic. Cf. Dalton, supra note 2, at 417
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scope of state jurisdiction over nonresidents appears to have halted. 158
Other than the Court's decision in Hall II, little activity in the area of
jurisdiction occurred during the survey period. The few decisions that were
reported, however, indicate that some confusion still exists among the state
appellate courts159 as to whether Hall II, which was unaffected by the
Supreme Court's decision insofar as its interpretation of article 203 lb is con-
cerned, eliminated the nexus requirement of the statute and, if so, in what
situations. The courts' confusion is exemplified by the Austin court of ap-
peals' decision in Steve Tyrell Production, Inc. v. Ray. 160 In Tyrell the court
stated that the cause of action must be shown to have arisen from or have
been connected with the defendant's activities within the state before long-
arm jurisdiction in Texas can be asserted; the court then, however, cited
Hall II as authority to the contrary.161 Any disagreement within the Fifth
Circuit related to article 2031b,162 however, appears to have been settled.
The lone Fifth Circuit decision during the survey period clearly recognized
that Hall H obviated the requirement that the cause of action arise from or
n. 192 (when the nonresident has numerous contacts with the forum state, the court presumes
that if it closely examined those contacts the court would find some relationship between those
contacts and the cause of action).
158. Two other significant United States Supreme Court decisions during the survey pe-
riod, however, appeared to extend the reach of in personam jurisdiction with respect to non-
resident print media defendants. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790 (1984), the Court held that although a defendant publisher's activities in the forum,
consisting of the sale of a substantial number of magazines in that state each month, may not
be sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the publisher, such activities
would be sufficient to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the defendant because
the underlying cause of action for libel arose out of those very sales. Id. at 1481-82, 79 L. Ed.
2d at 801-02. The plaintiff's lack of residence in the forum state did not defeat otherwise
proper jurisdiction, and, therefore, the defendant publisher could be required to defend a mul-
tistate libel action in the forum state. Id. at 1480-81, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800-01. In a companion
case, Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487-88, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 812-13 (1984), the Court
permitted the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident reporter and editor of an
article defaming plaintiff because the nonresidents' intentional and tortious actions were aimed
at the forum state, where both the publication had its largest circulation and the plaintiff re-
sided. The Court rejected the suggestion that first amendment concerns should enter into the
jurisdictional analysis, because protected first amendment activity is considered in the constitu-
tional limitations on the substantive law governing defamation suits and reintroducing those
concerns at the jurisdictional stage would result in double counting. Id. The Court's holding
is directly contrary to the Fifth Circuit's position, as recently stated by a federal district court,
that "[f]irst amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing
of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other
types of tortious activity." Stabler v. New York Times Co., 569 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (S.D.
Tex. 1983) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966)).
Keeton and Calder seem to indicate that although Hall may have narrowed the scope of per-
missible jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in general, print media defendants can rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court in any state where the publication has a regular
circulation and the forum has an interest in redressing the injury.
159. See Dalton, supra note 2, at 416-20 & nn.185-203.
160. 674 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
161. Id. at 434-35. The court interpreted Hall II as eliminating the nexus requirement only
in cases in which the nonresident has numerous contacts with Texas. Id. at 435; see also C.W.
Brown Mach. Shop, Inc. v. Stanley Mach. Corp., 670 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, no writ) (citing Hall II for the proposition that due process requires a nexus
between the cause of action and the nonresident's contacts with the forum state).
162. See Dalton, supra note 2, at 416-19 nn.185-97.
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be connected with the nonresident defendant's activities in the forum state
only when his numerous contacts are of such a nature as to satisfy the de-
mands of the ultimate test of due process.' 63
163. Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1984).
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